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Those who invested in many of the commonly called “Apple reverse convertibles,” now find themselves facing huge potential losses. But all hope is not lost, as investors may be able to recoup their losses.

The plight of these investors has been well documented recently.

What would you do if your broker tells you that you just bought Apple stock at a price of over $700 a share, even though after this past week’s collapse left the price hovering below $440? Now what would you do if you found out that you wound up with this “bum deal” by buying a product that was issued by your broker’s firm?

As recently reported by InvestmentNews, the estimated value of common stock in real estate investment trust (or REIT) of Wells Timberland REIT, Inc. fell to $6.56 per share. Given the illiquidity of the trust, finding that price in the market may prove difficult. That figure marks a 35% plunge in value since the REIT premiered in 2006 at $10 per share. Unfortunately, such incidents are all too common in a post-bubble real estate industry continuing to face adversity. Many of these incidents have caused substantial losses to investors who invested some or all of their savings in these ventures at the recommendation of their financial advisor.

The trust in question is controlled by Wells Real Estate Funds, an industry giant which has over $11 billion invested in real estate worldwide. Wells management has committed $37 million in preferred equity to this REIT alone, yet the trust currently appears to accrue annual dividends of a mere 1%. In October of 2011, redemption of trust shares was suspended until a new share value could be determined. Beginning next month, shareholders are apparently supposed to have the option of redemption, which will garner 95% of each share’s estimated value, or $6.23.

REITs in many instances can be considered to be high-risk endeavors: appealing for their potential for high gains due to their interest rates, but with equal if not unwarranted potential for resolute failure, and a possible lack of accountability toward investors. Too often, financials advisors describe high-risk investment products like REITs as safe, secured or guaranteed, typically to get the higher commission that these riskier investments pay. Misrepresenting the risk of an investment to a customer like that is against the law and rules under which these professionals work.

Despite theater’s common expression that “the show must go on”, a large-scale musical planned to hit Broadway this month has been postponed following accusations of fraud and breach of contract levied against its stockbroker.  For further definitions of fraud and “BoC”, visit the Investors page of our firm’s website.   

 

Long Island-based broker Mark Hotton, 46, of West Islip, NY, is alleged to have deceived producers of Rebecca: The Musical via two counts of wire fraud – for which he faces up to 20 years in prison on each count – and the supposed fabrication of four fake investors in the show, who Hotton claimed were prepared to invest $4.5 million.  The show’s producers have since filed suit for a sum exceeding $100 million against Hotton and his wife and business partner, Sherri Hotton. 

Hotton’s story itself is said to be one of grandstanding theatrics in its own right.  When producers attempted to secure funds from allegedly falsified investor “Paul Abrams”, Hotton is said to have told them that the man had recently died on an African safari after contracting malaria.  Hotton also created false e-mail accounts and United Kingdom based mailing addresses for his invented investors, even corresponding with Rebecca‘s producers under these false identities.

An intriguing new instance of whistleblowing has emerged from Clifford Jagodzinski, an ex-employee of Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC who claims that at least one highly successful broker for the firm was churning preferred securities in 2011. Churning in this case would violate not only state law, but also rules in place under the Dodd-Frank Act. For a further definition of churning, visit the Investors section of our company website. The Whistleblowers section of the site additionally identifies the nature of such cases and the firm’s unique interest in them.

The accused broker, wealth manager Harvey Kadden, was allegedly making tens of thousands of dollars in commissions despite supposedly taking actions which created minimal advances or even losses for his clients. Mr. Jagodzinski claims these moves “were obviously designed to bilk customers”. Mr. Kadden is said to have been recruited from Bank of America/Merrill Lynch, where he had worked for 30 years to great success, often appearing in Barron’s list of the Top 100 Financial Advisors.

Jagodzinski claims he was told to stop investigating Kadden by higher-ups within Morgan Stanley. Kadden is reported to have run a team of four brokers who had brought $14 million in profits to the company within the last 12 months, while managing a total of over $1 billion in customer portfolios.

Headline news charting the dramatic peaks and valleys of select Credit Suisse and Barclays properties prompted the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Inc. (FINRA) to issue a July warning to investors detailing the potential risks inherent to exchange-traded notes (or ETNs). The investor alert, entitled “Exchange Traded Notes – Avoid Unpleasant Surprises“, details vital notices to consumers on the nature of such properties.

“ETNs are complex products and can carry a raft of risks,” said Gerri Walsh, FINRA’s Vice President of Investor Education in a July 15th statement to Investment News. “Investors considering ETNs should only invest if they are confident the ETN can help them meet their investment objectives, and they fully understand and are comfortable with the risks.” Unfortunately, all too often these risks can be hidden from investors by their financial advisor.

Many investors may believe that ETNs are just like exchange-traded funds (or ETFs). However, despite their similar naming and being commonly categorized together, ETNs are quite different than ETFs. ETFs can be essentially characterized as a grouping of bonds or stocks that trade within the same day on an exchange. ETNs meanwhile, do not in fact hold anything, but rather are bank-drafted promissory notes intended to deliver the returns of an index. Unlike an ETF, an ETN in many respects is an uncollateralized loan to a bank, albeit one that offers theoretically great rewards to an index’s return. The value of an ETN is largely dependent on the given day’s market value of the index it tracks.

After years of concerns raised but never fully investigated by futures industry regulation, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and National Futures Association (NFA) took enforcement action July 9th against brokerage firm Peregrine Financial Group, also known as PFGBest. Peregrine founder Russell Wasendorf subsequently confessed to committing acts of embezzlement and fraud over the course of two decades, illegally acquiring over $100 million. Wasendorf was then arrested on charges of having lied to government regulators.

$215 million is believed to be missing from Peregrine’s pool of customer funds, with a recently forged bank statement claiming $221 million in company accounts with U.S. Bank, while the bank has Peregrine on file for only $6.3 million. Four regulatory actions have been against Peregrine since 1996 – with allegations including inaccurate accounting, insufficient capital, and problems with segregating customer money.

Wasendorf in writing confessed to having spent most of the funds embezzled over the course of his career, using the money to secure firm capital, purchase PFG’s corporate headquarters, and even pay regulatory fines and fees. In July, a half dozen customer claims on PFG were met with quotes of twenty-two to twenty-five cents on the dollar by CRT Capital Group, a limited liability company which deals in distressed debt.

Professor of economics Peter J. Henning wrote July 30th for the New York Times of the ever-changing definition of what classifies as “insider trading” in today’s market. Henning’s approach is at once streamlined and nuanced, walking us through a user-friendly tutorial of how and why fiduciary duties are upheld. Because insider trading holds no set definition within federal law, proving it within legal confines can be a hazy process. Henning illustrates this flexibility by profiling two recent cases filed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). For a detailed definition of fiduciary duty and its effects on one’s securities, visit the Investors page of our firm’s website.

Likely the most common claim cited within insider trading cases is violation of the SEC’s “Rule 10b-5” – subtitled “Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices” – which bans “any device, scheme, or artifice [used] to defraud” investors. Simply put, insider trading violates an investor’s rights when a financial representative takes confidential information and uses it for their own gains. Rule 10b-5 was created in 1942, after the SEC allegedly got word of a company’s president who lied to shareholders, claiming the company was doing poorly and then buying investors’ shares, when in fact their stock was booming. Henning writes that incredibly, until the inception of Rule 10b-5, such fraud was not explicitly prohibited.

Often insider trading violations amount to “jumping the gun” with regard to the exchange of information leading directly to trades of stock or other securities. Earlier this year, trader Larry Schvacho allegedly made over $500,000 from stock in Atlanta tech firm Comsys IT Partners. Last week the SEC set out to prove through civil action that Schvacho had been given non-public information as to the stock’s value by Larry Enterline, a close friend of Schvacho’s and chief executive at Comsys. Proving insider trading in this instance would likely require not only proof of possession of non-public information, but a determination that Schvacho breached the trust of his longtime confidante.

Recent front page woes of JPMorgan Chase and MFGlobal – as well as Barclays manipulation of Libor interest rates – have spurred debate as to whether our regulatory bodies are failing to meet watchdog standards of prosecuting financial crimes on Wall Street, and to what degree offending banks and brokers alone should be held accountable for their illegal activities. When Timothy Geithner, the current Treasury secretary and ex-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (herein referred to as “the Fed”) testified before the House Financial Services Committee last Wednesday, the discourse centered around concerns of cronyism between regulators and those they supervise, as well as a lack of legislative power for regulators to prosecute financial crime. For a thorough listing of New York regulators and industry associations available to consumers, visit the Resources page of our firm’s website.

The Fed, located in Lower Manhattan, places examiners inside the office’s of the nation’s largest banks. The office believes that those examiners sent into the field are said to be among the most “battle tested” and willing to challenge Wall Street wrongdoers on their violations. Yet the Fed itself does not enforce financial law, leaving punishments and fines to the Federal Reserve and other agencies such as the CFTC and SEC. “They focus on the safety and soundness of the banks, which ultimately means they are not particularly focused on market manipulation,” said Sheila C. Bair, the former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a fellow regulation branch.

The Fed is at once hindered by its lack of jurisdiction, while also being criticized for being considered by many to be excessively corroborative with the banks they are to supervise. Particularly noteworthy is the revelation that the Fed has allegedly known Barclays had been reporting false rates since 2008, yet did not stop (or in their view, were not authorized to stop) these actions. Given that the Fed cannot levy fines, it instead typically requests policy changes from a bank, alerting authorities at the Federal Reserve board only when the bank fails to comply for a sustained time period. It is then up to Federal Reserve to take disciplinary action.

Jenice Malecki will be speaking at the Practising Law Institute (PLI) Seminar tomorrow on Securities Arbitration 2012. If you cannot make it, there will be a webcast and course materials available.

Last year’s fervor over the fairness of arbitration has not so much subsided as it has been refined. In response to this shift, in 2012 FINRA will focus on streamlining and improving its dispute resolution forum, including fine-tuning the arbitrator disclosure process. FINRA’s goal is to ensure early disclosure of relevant arbitrator information, in order to save the parties the time and expense associated with replacing arbitrators whose disclosure is incomplete, while allowing for the parties’ continued input into the arbitrator selection process.

This year’s Securities Arbitration program will feature FINRA Dispute Resolution’s Director, staff, and arbitrators, as well as noted academics and experienced attorneys who represent both customers and industry players. Our faculty will explore FINRA’s efforts to improve the arbitrator disclosure process and provide you with practical tips on drafting claims and answers, striking and ranking proposed arbitrators, trying expungement hearings and resolving common ethical dilemmas that arise in securities arbitration practice.

Last week’s July 3rd edition of the New York Times reports that past and present brokers from mutual fund giant JPMorgan Chase were encouraged to favor JPMorgan products in their financial advisement to customers, even when competitor products were better performing or better suited to a consumer’s budget. Moreover, JPMorgan marketing materials are said to have exaggerated the profits made from at least one major offering. For a further definition of misrepresentation and unsuitability, as well as an understanding of potentially defective products, visit the Investors section of our firm’s website.

JPMorgan’s marketing measures appear to have led to several profitable post-crisis years for the company. This success has come despite a volatile market that has shaken investor confidence in funds, and findings from fund researcher Morningstar that since 2009, 42% of JPMorgan funds have failed to meet the average performance of comparable products.

There has been concern from market analysts that consumers in many cases are being sold JPMorgan products based on theoretical returns over actual performance. Apparently, one balanced JPMorgan portfolio boasts professes a hypothetical return of 15.39% of fees after fees over three years, the reported return was 13.87%, lower not only than the advertised hypothetical, but also the standard of comparison JPMorgan depicts in marketing materials.

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